The Kuwaitis have fighter planes and ground troops in Yemen in the Saudi-led coalition, and their participation in the conflict on the side of the government against the Houthis does not naturally make them a natural broker for peace. So what has brought the Houthis to Kuwait for the current set of peace talks, and what kind of outcome might we expect?

While the jury is still out on the extent of Iranian influence over the Houthis, the Houthis also have few other visible allies – perhaps none – outside of the country. Any external pressure  exerted to bring them to the table will have come from Iran. The Iranians will have most success in influencing these talks in a regional setting, preferably in a friendly, third-party state.

Saudi Arabia is out of the question; the other Gulf states are involved in the conflict, and have strained-or-no ties with Iran. Oman, a potentially good location, has consistently declined to get involved with the problems of its neighbour. This leaves Kuwait. Kuwait successfully walks a diplomatic tightrope between Saudi Arabia and Iran in its own affairs, and although its role in the conflict makes it less than ideal, it is sufficiently acceptable to both regional powerhouses.

Attending talks is one thing, achieving a lasting peace agreement is another. This requires a political solution. The Kuwait talks are also being pushed by the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and the Houthis may well perceive these talks as a continuation of the GCC-driven, UN-approved, political dialogue process. This was a process which they disengaged from in 2014 when they decided that their safe and meaningful participation could not be assured.

The Houthis have been military active and pushing their agenda for 12 years already. This is with or without the support of Iran and/or the intervention of the GCC into Yemen’s affairs. A brief episode of external pressure is unlikely to get them to drop (or reduce) any fundamental demands. Nor is it likely that the Kuwaitis will be able to convince them of the validity of any GCC-sponsored process, given their previous experience.

Instead of pushing the GCC political agenda too early, the Kuwaitis could spend this time convincing the Houthis that they are prepared to at least listen to their views and demands. Then a ceasefire between the government and the Houthis – and thus a halt to Saudi coalition airstrikes – is not impossible. If they can achieve that, then Kuwait will have shown that it is the right setting for future, political, dialogue.