It has been a tense weekend in Egypt. Hamas has been further increasing border defences to prevent any armed groups from entering Gaza from Egypt, and eight policemen were killed in a drive-by shooting on the outskirts of Cairo this morning.

The western press has made an issue of coordination between Egypt, Israel and Hamas in the securing of the border. To describe Israel and Hamas reinforcing border security as ‘coordination’ is overstating the reality. They are operating independently in self-interest. Hamas is cooperating with Egypt however, because it is far more dependent on better, formal relations with Egypt than on any informal relationships it may have with Sinai militants. Egypt is obliged to coordinate its military activity in Sinai with Israel, as part of its obligations under the Camp David peace agreement.

Tighter border control may reduce access to weapons and restrict movement in Sinai, but it will not stop the intent of militants to conduct attacks. This is a guerilla conflict waged by a group of locals who understand the terrain and are a part of the local population. They also understand the local economic dependence on transport and tourism very well as their base grievances stem from political and economic marginalization, and access to the benefits of these industries. Instead, they have been avoiding civilians or tourists and targeting the police – who have a reputation for torture and violence. It allows them to maintain their support-base. The downing of the Russian airliner was exceptional in this regard, and it implies a degree of foreign involvement.

This morning’s attack on the police was different because it was in the mainland. Although it’s not the first time that it’s happened, it is uncommon. Coming now with the border closures, it suggests a connection – the militants and local population are feeling the squeeze. As more government pressure is applied throughout Sinai, attacks on mainland locations are likely to increase. At the same time, there is nothing to suggest that anything other than the police and army will be targeted. This does leave space for escalation however: moving attacks on middle-to-upper-class residential areas, civilians accepted as collateral damage, civilians deliberately targeted, and then to tourist locations.

Given that grievances of the Bedouin-origin militants are based on political and economic exclusion, it seems to me that the best route to avoid escalation would be to complement the ongoing military activities with a political and economic approach.