Last night, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi used twitter to announce that the operation to retake Fallujah has begun. For the local inhabitants this is simply the latest iteration in a repetitive cycle of resistance, destruction, and reconstruction. In terms of the wider picture however, recapture of Fallujah will be major nail in the coffin of ISIS in Iraq.

The advantage, if there is one, to undertaking so much conflict on a single geography over a period of 12 years is that many lessons have been learned, tribal affiliations well understood, and urban geography familiar. The routing of previous militants, such as the Sunni resistance in 2004, and the Zarqawi network in 2007, shows that removing terrorist groups from Fallujah can be done.

The Iraqi army has just battle-tested 12,500 troops in the operation of neighbouring Ramadi – a bigger city – and this has proved a sufficient number of troops for previous assaults on Fallujah. The Iraqi forces understand the psychology of their opponents, and are confident following their military success. Importantly, and worryingly, they will not be constrained to avoiding collateral damage to the same extent as U.S. forces, for example. Last night’s videos showing Katusha-type rocket launchers releasing salvos of unguided missiles on ISIS positions in Fallujah confirms this.

On the other hand, Fallujah residents also have a long history of resistance to outsiders that predates the 2003 invasion.  Fallujah was also the first Iraqi city to fall to ISIS, and the ISIS presence has apparently been appealing to Fallujah’s residents. The local population is fiercely against the Shia-dominated central government. That being said, Fallujah has been under siege for some months, there is reportedly little food left in the city and that ISIS is preventing any of the 90,000 inhabitants from leaving. The population will be weakened, and local support for the foreign elements of ISIS eroded.

What can we expect to happen?

Unless there has already been significant, unannounced ground forces build-up, the escalation of air and artillery preparation of ISIS positions will continue for several days, and people encouraged to leave. Then we will see a carbon copy of the Ramadi offensive: forward operations undertaken by Iraqi special forces units with coalition air-support; regular forces consolidating any gains; and limited participation of the Shia’ popular militias on the periphery. Militia participation is controversial given Sunni sensibilities. It bolsters the number of troops however, and represents a tough psychological option, should the government choose to use it.

If the foreign fighters are removed from Fallujah within the next 2.5 months, then we will know that the approach has been as effective as previous ones on the city. There will then be an opportunity to work on bridging grievances with local/Iraqi militants. Iraqi forces will also be ready, psychologically as well as militarily, to turn to Mosul.