The main Islamic party in Tunisia, Al-Nahda, announced this week that it is distancing itself from ‘political Islam’. According to the ‘intellectual leader’ of Al-Nahda, Rached Ghannouchi, it plays no role in post-Arab Spring Tunisia. Elected officials within the party will no longer be able to moonlight in civil society groups, such as religious or charitable organisations.

Al-Nahda is the second largest party in government, with around 28 % of the parliamentary seats, so on the face of it, this move seals the deal on a post-revolution, secular democracy. But soundbites designed to find favour with tourists and the IMF hide a more complex picture.

Ghannouchi also said: “From today, we are seriously moving towards becoming a national and civil political party with an Islamic core, which operates under the country’s constitution and inspires Muslim and modern values”. If religious values remain at the core of the party then Islam will still inform and guide all party policy.

In post-revolution Tunisia, when Al-Nahda was allowed to form, it promoted an Islamist ticket and won the first elections. Only five years ago then, most of the Tunisian public had an appetite for some flavour of political Islam. Two years later, in 2013, violent Islamists were also identified with Al-Nahda. Although that caused a fall from grace at the 2014 election, the party still represents about half of the country.

Political Islam has been a force within the Middle East since the Islamic Revolution in Iran and it will not just disappear. This is probably all just window-dressing.

If nothing has changed then, what is the problem?

At the moment, Tunisia is clamping down hard on extremism, and there are reports of mass detentions of salafists – many of whom could simply be non-violent, ultra-conservatives. Combined with considerable economic hardship, a clampdown on the black economy, in areas where Al-Nahda is located, it is a dangerous mix of structural factors.

Within this context, political Islam been located at the heart of government since the revolution, the conservative factions within Al-Nahda will have felt that they have a voice. Modifying the language that these people can use, will restrict this voice, and it will push some away from the mainstream political process.