Syria ceasefire discussions in which Kurdish YPG, the U.S., and the UN are not participating might – on the face of it – appear of limited effectiveness. It might also seem skewed with respect to any follow-on political discussions managed by the UN in Geneva.

Unlike the mainstream track in Geneva however, the bulk of the Astana participants are actually facing off against one another on the ground. This includes the Turkish, Russian, and Iranian guarantors. If these parties can truly self-organise into a ceasefire talk, then that’s a significant milestone. Additional participants would complicate discussions.

On the political side, the main gap at Astana is undoubtedly the Kurdish YPG. It would difficult for any of the Security Council members to take issue with this though: at US request the YPG was excluded from the last Geneva meeting.

With the YPG absent, one important matter that the Astana participants will all likely be in agreement on is that Syria should not be federalized. If the group can create a “united delegation” for Geneva, as one commentator put it, they will be able to head off Kurdish federalism at the pass.

Even if the meeting is able to get past the very basics and turn political on the issue of federalism, the ramifications are still not important enough to warrant the inclusion of additional participants. That is because pushing a federal Kurdish region in Syria is probably illegal under international law: any action that creates any divisions along ethnic or linguistic grounds, amongst others, constitutes a breach of the “perspective for the future” outlined in the Geneva communique of 30 June 2012, referenced in UNSC 2554. A Kurdish federal area would be ethnically and linguistically defined.

Other political matters that could come up at this ceasefire meeting are transition, and the redrafting of the constitution. Since Turkey has a leading role in Astana, the Assad issue will not disappear in Kazakhstan, so long as the Turks have not instigated a covert change of policy.

As for the constitution, Assad explicitly acknowledges that it will form the basis of discussions, and that a referendum will determine any changes – exactly as written in the Geneva Communique. Presumably even the most hardline groups at Astana are not opposed to a constitution, rather its details and application.

From an international perspective then, many of the elements of UNSC 2554, and the Geneva Communique of 2012 would actually be fulfilled in this meeting. If people round the table in Astana can see that they now are aligned on big picture items, they could potentially set themselves up for constructive political negotiations down the line – in Geneva or elsewhere.