The Syria ceasefire talks opened today in Astana. In a meeting with such a short turnaround time (24 hours), outcomes are brutally dependent on how realistic expectations are.

If there has been any progress in Syria it relates to the coalescence of interests. Whereas most stakeholders – international or otherwise – in previous meetings have had different agendas, we now have a clear battlefront developing: Syria with international backers versus the armed (moderate) opposition.

In such a complex campaign this is, in fact, a major development. Excluding ISIS, at the highest level at least, Syria has entered a more manageable and classical picture of civil conflict.

From the news reports It is clear that Russia, Syria, and the UN have had the opportunity to align their expectations fairly closely – mainly around opening lines of communication, making a separation between armed groups they will negotiate with and extremists. Last Friday, even Turkey dropped its demand for Assad to go.

On the other hand, it is not clear whether the armed opposition have any unified expectations. More than 15 groups make up this side of the delegation, they are only loosely associated in the field, and presumably have priorities than harmonizing their political objectives – yet now is very much the time to do this.

The rebel spokesman, Mohammed Alloush, made reference to a political solution which respected rights “to live” to “freedom”, to “decide our fate”, to “decide the people to represent them”. These are all fair statements, but when demands shift to political negotiations it will have to be tighter than this. Assad has indicated that everything in the constitution is negotiable; now is the time for the opposition to articulate what exactly they wish to change.

Both sides would do well to further align their views – the stronger the alignment, the stronger they will be (both on or off the battlefield). It will also exponentially improve the prospects for political dialogue in Geneva.

If the opposition remains passive in this exercise, there will be no pressure for them to unite their views; without a united front, the prospects of negotiating a political settlement with (at least) 15 parties is slim. That will be to their detriment.

In any case, Astana is too short for negotiating a substantive political settlement. A political settlement is also not possible while fighting remains dynamic – as it does near Damascus – as the strength of negotiating positions may change. Participants at Astana should at this point focus on a ceasefire, or building on the one brokered by the Russians and Turks a month or so ago.

UN Special Representative Staffan de Mistura, who (correctly) decided to attend, and the U.S. who attended through their Ambassador to Kazakhstan, would both do well to study the format, tone, and views of participants at the meeting. That way they can aim to deliver the best “psychological contract” possible for participants in Geneva.