Defining ISIS for policy purposes

One of President Trump’s campaign promises was the destruction of ISIS. Under current circumstances, how long will it take to defeat ISIS, if at all? What can be done to increase the efficacy the current approach?

Counter ISIS operations got off to a slow start – 2-3 years after the group first started to take shape. Once it did, however, degradation picked up a pace. In Syria and Iraq and estimated 25,000 ISIS personnel were killed over 11 months, while over a similar period in Afghanistan the number of local ISIS fighters were reduced by at more than half – completely expelling them from numerous provinces.

In Syria the recent extent of gains has been reduced, but we can expect the ground campaign to accelerate as-and-when there is traction in the ceasefire and political dialogue. In Iraq we can expect ISIS to be completely routed, as-and-when the attack on Mosul is completed.

On the current trajectory then – and against ISIS specifically – the U.S can expect: wins in Iraq or Syria; steady degradation of capacity in Afghanistan; and no change or worse, in Yemen or any other country where there are no U.S operations.

In terms of changing or accelerating this trajectory the geographic scope of operations can be extended; and/or the strategic mix of activities can be adjusted.

As long as we are being strict with definitions about defeating ISIS however, there is no need to extend the scope of operations to any additional country. Despite their proclamation of a worldwide caliphate, defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in both Iraq and Syria will force the group to rebrand if not disband. Fortunately ISIS’s centre of gravity – which is in Syria and Iraq – offers realistic prospect of near-term military success.

If definitions are not strict, then any new strategy has the potential to grow arms and legs very quickly in terms of global military commitments. It would swiftly reduce to countering any other form of decentralized, international-jihadi organization – of the type we have known for decades.

If pursuing a policy of capturing low-hanging fruit in Iraq and Syria, one strategic adjustment could be to prioritise a more militarized approach in the short-term. This would be on the basis that complete victory in those countries will automatically undermine the ideology, recruitment, and funding of ISIS globally. Tactical shifts could include harmonization of airstrikes with non-traditional partners such as Russia (now a possibility). It could also include boosting ground forces in support of Iraqi government or Peshmerga forces for the attack on Mosul; although this would risk interaction with Iranian forces – a complex scenario if a review of U.S. sanctions against Iran is in the policy pipeline.

In any case, a fair amount could potentially be done with little additional resource – particularly in Syria.

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