The talks in Astana seem to have either stalled or, if not completely ground to a halt, riding down in first gear. The Syrian opposition did not send a negotiating team – they sent a ‘technical’ team, apparently just to fill seats. There were also disagreements between the Syria government and Turkey, as well as a rare public disagreement between Russian and Syrian governments on the content of discussions. In the end, it provided a platform for Syria, Turkey, and Iran to review campaign progress.

Shortly after the closure of the talks the rebels mounted a major attack just outside Damascus, as if to signal: we’re still here, you must take us seriously.

It is hard not to feel sympathy for the disparate rebel groups. They have been corralled into a process that they are ethically-bound to attend, if they can ever claim to wish for a peaceful solution. The unhelpful admonishments from the Syrian regime combined with a general un-familiarity with diplomatic context means that their participation in these events is all the more noteworthy.

At the same time to attempt to move forward in such meetings with both gun and olive branch is to completely undermine the legitimacy of the framework. Repeated, failed meetings will reduce the discussions to an irrelevancy.

It goes without saying that while the parties believe they can better achieve their objectives through armed conflict they will never fully invest in the talks. Even if that were not the case, the talks are unlikely to move beyond anything other than a ceasefire agreement while two major conceptual issues remain:

1. The Syrian regime’s slavish insistence to talking about “anti-terrorism”. Regardless of the classification of various groups operating in Syria and their various organisational objectives, this classification in the context of ceasefire discussions obfuscates the objectively-verifiable facts provided by five years of full-blown insurgency. This is a serious case of drinking your own cool aid. It is far more effective to participate in the talks from a position of reality rather than one of propaganda.
2. The Syrian Opposition’s dogged refusal to accept any vision for Syria that includes Assad, while at the same time neglecting to provide a unified set of (concrete) demands which are not personality-based. Assad sits at the top of the pile, yes, but he cannot operate without the support of a system – a system which has refused to give way under immense pressure – and the response needs to be a systemic one. Even better, these demands should be made public, and published, not just in Arabic, but in English, and circulated to the world. Apart from anything else, the world might also begin to forget why the opposition is fighting.

So far as Astana goes, perhaps it would be worth making a formal reassessment what each side hopes to gain from the talks; a form of psychological contract, in which expectations are managed and made realistic.

Opposition demands must harmonise, gain in clarity and hold out the prospect of being actionable.  If that does not happen, then this conflict will swiftly become one exclusively driven by grievance and external powers. That would add tragedy upon an already unspeakable tragedy.

At the current time, it does not seem as though Astana could accomplish more than a ceasefire. Perhaps that is what they should be billed as: talks designed to bring about the technicalities of a ceasefire.