The leader of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Nusra Front in Syria, Abu Mohammad Al-Golani, has cast his doubts as to whether some of the groups within the Free Syrian Army are “legitimate”. This comment drew a polite, yet angry response from the FSA leadership. The FSA reasoned that by calling parts of the FSA illegitimate, the Al-Nusra Front strengthens the case for Russian intervention in Syria – they should be focusing on the common enemy.

There are more than 50 “CIA-vetted” organisations that comprise the FSA, and this quantity gives a large margin for error in terms of the types of groups within the overall structure. Al-Golani may also be the man to know whether some units are crossing over to the side of religious extremism. Al-Nusra Front has reportedly been fighting alongside an FSA-affiliated organization, Faylaq al-Rahman, in Ghouta earlier this month.

This is an extremely important issue. Up until recently, U.S-led coalition collaboration with Al-Qaeda-affiliated organisations has been prevented by at least two degrees of separation.

Separation has so far been achieved because the tens of small, largely secular groups that make up the loosely-bound FSA receive U.S backing on the understanding that they do not directly support any groups on the international terrorism list. The FSA groups form one half of a larger umbrella organization – the Revolutionary Command Council. The other half of the Council contains so-called ‘moderate’ Islamic groups. The Islamic groups are funded by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey; and they can also openly align with ‘extremist’ groups – except the Islamic State – without affecting their funding, and they routinely do.

Today, the Syrian government’s gains on the ground may well mean that scattered FSA units choose to jeopardise their western support by linking with the Al-Nusra Front nearby for short term survival. Wherever FSA groups are directly supporting Al-Nusra Front, then the western backers are only one degree of separation from collaborating with Al-Qaeda.

For the occasional skirmish this could go unnoticed or even be overlooked. If it becomes commonplace it will raise serious issues in the U.S-led coalition.

The FSA has been trying to get Al-Nusra Front to cut ties with Al-Qaida for some time so that they can openly align with them. Al-Nusra Front made the call long ago however, that getting backing from the west is not a part of their strategy. Al-Golani is also betting that the Syrian regime will continue to expend its efforts on fighting the FSA before it turns to the jihadist groups, and that the FSA needs Al-Nusra Front now more than Al-Nusra Front needs the FSA.

Tunisia achieved political pluralism without any outside assistance. Five years later, the government has voted to ease its control of its financial institutions in return for a USD 2.8 billion IMF loan package. As part of its tightening control of the economy, the government has also been clamping down on the black economy by closing down smuggling routes along the Libyan border.

The first strategy has drawn a boycott from the lefitist parties in government. The second has led to civic disturbances in some of the poorest areas of the country. Could this destabilization be increasing the threat of Islamist terrorism? There were a number of security incidents today that indicate this is still alive-and-well in Tunisia.

The reforms being pushed by the IMF are not the same that have led to such political unrest in Europe, yet. However, this is still a particularly challenging time to be dismantling or restructuring any institutions. Food and fuel price increases, a dormant tourism industry, and sensitivities to the European crisis mean country-wide economic hardship. Even if necessary, reforms will contribute to fear and uncertainty in the short-term – particularly on the periphery.

More importantly, the crackdown on the black economy is leading to violence. Disorder is likely to continue in the south and east of the country where the black economy plays a greater role in ensuring livelihoods. So far, the leftists and national labour union have been able to take advantage of these economic grievances. Political Islam is the dominant political affiliation in the areas where there is most economic dissatisfaction however. There is the possibility that violence escalates, and the cause exploited by militants.

For now, the homegrown extremist threat which emerged in the early years of the revolution remains suppressed. Despite these current events, it will likely remain suppressed for as long as the Islamist parties remain active in the national political process, and government responses to civil disobedience are even-handed. Instead, terrorist activity in Tunisia will be dominated by externally-affiliated groups, and any form of social destabilisation draws attention away from their activities.

Saudi Arabia’s planned IPO of around 5% of its national oil company, Aramco, has been causing considerable speculation in the press. An estimated 90% of the Aramco’s worth is based on its oil reserves valued at the current market price. Based on current oil price, this is a terrible time to be selling even a small percentage of this important asset. Why are the Saudis doing this?

There is talk of raising financing for various non-oil programmes but the main reason is that Saudi Arabia urgently needs cash. By the time of the proposed IPO the total budget deficit will be around 190 billion USD. In just two years this deficit will have eaten into 25% of the Saudi foreign exchange cash reserve. Government debt financing is an option, but since the credit rating agencies have been steadily downgrading the Saudi rating, this is not as attractive as going out to market with something.

At the current oil price, I calculate the value of 5% of Aramco to be approximately 220 billion USD. A sale now would cover the budget deficit, but the Saudis will want to get as much out of the sale as possible. Additional funds will give them something to show for the sale, which can then be invested on their other reform programmes, or meet their military spending commitments, for example.

Because of its vast reserves and lowest production cost, Saudi Arabia controls the minimum market value of oil in the global market place. Since they control the value of the commodity on which Aramco is built, the Saudis can control the value of the IPO.  My suggestion is that the Saudis will raise the global price of oil by constraining oil production close to the time of the IPO. This will raise the value of Aramco stock for the sale, giving the Saudis as much cash as possible. All things being equal, OPEC will be firmly on-side for these changes.

Saudi Arabia has been keeping oil prices low because it wants to keep new producers out of the global oil markets (e.g. U.S. shale), and to retain its market share. It also wants to repress Iranian oil production by hindering the investment Iran needs restart its oil industry. The timing of the IPO is an indicator of when Saudi Arabia believes the strategy has sufficiently paid off. If success comes earlier or later, then I believe that the date of the IPO will shift accordingly.

It has been a tense weekend in Egypt. Hamas has been further increasing border defences to prevent any armed groups from entering Gaza from Egypt, and eight policemen were killed in a drive-by shooting on the outskirts of Cairo this morning.

The western press has made an issue of coordination between Egypt, Israel and Hamas in the securing of the border. To describe Israel and Hamas reinforcing border security as ‘coordination’ is overstating the reality. They are operating independently in self-interest. Hamas is cooperating with Egypt however, because it is far more dependent on better, formal relations with Egypt than on any informal relationships it may have with Sinai militants. Egypt is obliged to coordinate its military activity in Sinai with Israel, as part of its obligations under the Camp David peace agreement.

Tighter border control may reduce access to weapons and restrict movement in Sinai, but it will not stop the intent of militants to conduct attacks. This is a guerilla conflict waged by a group of locals who understand the terrain and are a part of the local population. They also understand the local economic dependence on transport and tourism very well as their base grievances stem from political and economic marginalization, and access to the benefits of these industries. Instead, they have been avoiding civilians or tourists and targeting the police – who have a reputation for torture and violence. It allows them to maintain their support-base. The downing of the Russian airliner was exceptional in this regard, and it implies a degree of foreign involvement.

This morning’s attack on the police was different because it was in the mainland. Although it’s not the first time that it’s happened, it is uncommon. Coming now with the border closures, it suggests a connection – the militants and local population are feeling the squeeze. As more government pressure is applied throughout Sinai, attacks on mainland locations are likely to increase. At the same time, there is nothing to suggest that anything other than the police and army will be targeted. This does leave space for escalation however: moving attacks on middle-to-upper-class residential areas, civilians accepted as collateral damage, civilians deliberately targeted, and then to tourist locations.

Given that grievances of the Bedouin-origin militants are based on political and economic exclusion, it seems to me that the best route to avoid escalation would be to complement the ongoing military activities with a political and economic approach.

The Kuwaitis have fighter planes and ground troops in Yemen in the Saudi-led coalition, and their participation in the conflict on the side of the government against the Houthis does not naturally make them a natural broker for peace. So what has brought the Houthis to Kuwait for the current set of peace talks, and what kind of outcome might we expect?

While the jury is still out on the extent of Iranian influence over the Houthis, the Houthis also have few other visible allies – perhaps none – outside of the country. Any external pressure  exerted to bring them to the table will have come from Iran. The Iranians will have most success in influencing these talks in a regional setting, preferably in a friendly, third-party state.

Saudi Arabia is out of the question; the other Gulf states are involved in the conflict, and have strained-or-no ties with Iran. Oman, a potentially good location, has consistently declined to get involved with the problems of its neighbour. This leaves Kuwait. Kuwait successfully walks a diplomatic tightrope between Saudi Arabia and Iran in its own affairs, and although its role in the conflict makes it less than ideal, it is sufficiently acceptable to both regional powerhouses.

Attending talks is one thing, achieving a lasting peace agreement is another. This requires a political solution. The Kuwait talks are also being pushed by the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and the Houthis may well perceive these talks as a continuation of the GCC-driven, UN-approved, political dialogue process. This was a process which they disengaged from in 2014 when they decided that their safe and meaningful participation could not be assured.

The Houthis have been military active and pushing their agenda for 12 years already. This is with or without the support of Iran and/or the intervention of the GCC into Yemen’s affairs. A brief episode of external pressure is unlikely to get them to drop (or reduce) any fundamental demands. Nor is it likely that the Kuwaitis will be able to convince them of the validity of any GCC-sponsored process, given their previous experience.

Instead of pushing the GCC political agenda too early, the Kuwaitis could spend this time convincing the Houthis that they are prepared to at least listen to their views and demands. Then a ceasefire between the government and the Houthis – and thus a halt to Saudi coalition airstrikes – is not impossible. If they can achieve that, then Kuwait will have shown that it is the right setting for future, political, dialogue.

Israeli Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked has been pushing for the application of Israeli law in the West Bank settlements. It’s an initiative that has been tried before.  The argument against doing this is that it is a form of annexation. By this measure, the Golan Heights – which was also occupied during the 1967 conflict – was annexed in 1981, when Israeli law was applied throughout that area.

Two things strike me through this comparison that may have implications for any peace deals with Syrians and the Palestinians respectively. The first is the status of indigenous peoples, and their current satisfaction with the legal framework in which they live. The second is the issue of law enforcement.

On the first point: there is recent evidence that the Druze population in the Golan Heights is keen to maintain their status quo with respect to the rule of law. No doubt fueled by the chaos across the border. I include here last year’s mob attacks on Israeli ambulances carrying Syrians wounded from nearby fighting; and the reported increase in the numbers of Druze seeking Israeli citizenship. Unlike the Palestinians, citizenship is open for Golan Druze, and while taking it up may be considered crossing the identity Rubicon, it is still an option.

In terms of policy impact, the probability of Israel considering handing back the strategic Golan to Syria under any circumstances is currently vanishingly small. Yet the issue will not simply disappear. In the future however, the more Druze that have naturalised as Israelis, the less likely they would (or even could?) vote in a referendum to return to Syrian rule – even under an enduring peace.

On the second point of law enforceability: the settlements in the West Bank are already operating outside international law. Thus the law applied by the state of Israel to Jewish settlers in the West Bank is, today, almost a moot point. Nevertheless, who decides on the law and most importantly, who can enforce the law in any area of the West Bank, is the kernel of the of the sovereignty debate – Israeli or Palestinian.

Under a two state solution for example, the endurance of Israeli law in any remaining settlements would demand that the institutions of the judiciary and the security apparatus remain in place – such as the police, and the intelligence services. Israeli law within the settlements would thus help to preserve a de facto state within a state..

The introduction of Israeli law into the West Bank geographic area may seem a technical issue or even redundant, but it has highly political, non-trivial implications.

Al-Jazeera television has been focusing much of its coverage to the crisis situation in Aleppo. One question raised by commentators is why the February ceasefire agreement does not seem to apply to the situation in the city and surrounding countryside.

A look at the text of the ceasefire agreement shows that the largely U.S.-backed, armed opposition groups are accountable for their actions either to Russia or the United States, as they prefer. While on the other side, the Syrian Arab Republic is to report its activities under the ceasefire to the Russian Federation – an active belligerent in the conflict. More importantly: that the Russian Federation is entitled to report directly to itself regarding its own activities such as airstrikes, against the armed opposition.

The ceasefire covers proportional use of force in defence and the acquisition of new territory. This accountability arrangement gives at least one side in the conflict considerable latitude in interpretation of any breach; and fewer constraints to continuing hostilities.

U.S. forces are not referenced specifically as belligerents in the February ceasefire text. At the same time, there are reports that the United States has been conducting strikes against ISIS in the same geographic location at least until early April 2016. There is nothing to hinder further U.S. – led strikes in the city against ISIS. In other words, a seperate conflict can continue to take place within the geographic area of an other conflict.

Based on the text of the ceasefire agreement alone, it is unsurprising that the use of force and acquisition of new territory continues. The February ceasefire agreement was an important milestone in the conflict. Moving forward however, and in the absence of a neutral monitoring mechanism, potentially defencible exceptions to the ceasefire agreement can continue to arise.

Ceasefire agreement text, accessed 2/5/2016 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253115.htm).

I started this blog as an outlet for my thinking on current events in the Middle East. I’m  using Arabic-language news sources to determine which topics I look at.