The talks in Astana seem to have either stalled or, if not completely ground to a halt, riding down in first gear. The Syrian opposition did not send a negotiating team – they sent a ‘technical’ team, apparently just to fill seats. There were also disagreements between the Syria government and Turkey, as well as a rare public disagreement between Russian and Syrian governments on the content of discussions. In the end, it provided a platform for Syria, Turkey, and Iran to review campaign progress.

Shortly after the closure of the talks the rebels mounted a major attack just outside Damascus, as if to signal: we’re still here, you must take us seriously.

It is hard not to feel sympathy for the disparate rebel groups. They have been corralled into a process that they are ethically-bound to attend, if they can ever claim to wish for a peaceful solution. The unhelpful admonishments from the Syrian regime combined with a general un-familiarity with diplomatic context means that their participation in these events is all the more noteworthy.

At the same time to attempt to move forward in such meetings with both gun and olive branch is to completely undermine the legitimacy of the framework. Repeated, failed meetings will reduce the discussions to an irrelevancy.

It goes without saying that while the parties believe they can better achieve their objectives through armed conflict they will never fully invest in the talks. Even if that were not the case, the talks are unlikely to move beyond anything other than a ceasefire agreement while two major conceptual issues remain:

1. The Syrian regime’s slavish insistence to talking about “anti-terrorism”. Regardless of the classification of various groups operating in Syria and their various organisational objectives, this classification in the context of ceasefire discussions obfuscates the objectively-verifiable facts provided by five years of full-blown insurgency. This is a serious case of drinking your own cool aid. It is far more effective to participate in the talks from a position of reality rather than one of propaganda.
2. The Syrian Opposition’s dogged refusal to accept any vision for Syria that includes Assad, while at the same time neglecting to provide a unified set of (concrete) demands which are not personality-based. Assad sits at the top of the pile, yes, but he cannot operate without the support of a system – a system which has refused to give way under immense pressure – and the response needs to be a systemic one. Even better, these demands should be made public, and published, not just in Arabic, but in English, and circulated to the world. Apart from anything else, the world might also begin to forget why the opposition is fighting.

So far as Astana goes, perhaps it would be worth making a formal reassessment what each side hopes to gain from the talks; a form of psychological contract, in which expectations are managed and made realistic.

Opposition demands must harmonise, gain in clarity and hold out the prospect of being actionable.  If that does not happen, then this conflict will swiftly become one exclusively driven by grievance and external powers. That would add tragedy upon an already unspeakable tragedy.

At the current time, it does not seem as though Astana could accomplish more than a ceasefire. Perhaps that is what they should be billed as: talks designed to bring about the technicalities of a ceasefire.

In the game of “whack-a-mole” that represents the counter-insurgency operation in Iraq over the last 13 years, the prospect of re-capturing Mosul from the Islamic State is something of a milestone. The reason why it is so important is that ISIS will have effectively lost its claim to holding any cities in Iraq – the country where their story began.  With victory now in sight, I thought I’d take a look back at what I wrote last year about Mosul, with a view to taking stock on the current state of play against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

In late May of 2016, the anti-ISIS offensive on Fallujah was at its height, and some commentators were discussing whether Mosul or Al-Raqqa would be next to fall. At the time, I speculated that as long as the conflict between Syrian Armed Forces and non-ISIS actors persisted – and the international approach remained disjointed – Mosul would next. Some nine months later that has proved correct. Later that same month, I also mused that taking Mosul would require overcoming certain psychological hurdles: namely that because the city fell so easily to ISIS in 2014, its capture had afforded the terrorist group a certain military prowess. I felt that battle-hardening in Fallujah would prove to be the most effective remedy.

Not only has Fallujah replenished Iraqi military morale, but it has helped to solidify their tactics: the approach adopted for the siege of Mosul has been taken straight from the textbook of Fallujah and Ramadi. In practice, this means a creeping period of peripheral skirmishes; the massing of various militia groups; setting up of roadblocks and cutting off of supply lines into the city; encouraging the displacement of residents; and psychological operations across the media – showcasing the potential brutality of Iraqi forces (whether real or not, remains to be seen).

Nevertheless retaking Mosul has proved more complex than either Fallujah or Ramadi by at least a whole order-of-magnitude. Instead of sitting along a main road in a flat, sparsely inhabited region, Mosul is a densely populated, sprawling urban centre in the highlands of the country. Instead of homogenous tribal-religious affiliations in the host population, Mosul has a broad mixture of inhabitants. Like other ancient, continuously inhabited cities in the general region, Mosul has experienced plenty of warfare and sieges down the centuries. This has come to define the city as ‘defensible’ in a way that places such as Ramadi and Fallujah – that are mainly comprised of 20^th century buildings and city plans – are not.

This has also been demonstrated in the timeline: while the liberation of Ramadi and Fallujah was in the order of a couple of months; the siege of Mosul has been ongoing now for almost half a year.

So what is next?

Once Mosul falls, Iraq will have denied ISIS its control of territory, which will force the group back into a disenfranchised position. This will be to at least the level prior to the ISIS ‘surge’ in Iraq of 2014. Such a defeat for ISIS cannot easily be recovered; the zeitgeist of global support for ISIS appears to have waned with its fortunes, the strength of call to their jihad grows weaker with each set-back. Although the writing may be on the wall for ISIS as a state/caliphate, the prospect that Iraq will be freed from the spectre of terrorism from extremist Sunni groups is, however, non-existent. All the same, Iraq will have moved a big step further in the right direction, and once again the state can claim the monopoly on violence within the country’s borders – a necessary condition for bona fide statehood. That is the national picture.

On the local level, the population of Mosul will start to rebuild, and they will look for effective governance and the rule of law – both of which must fill the void as swiftly as possible, as otherwise further tragedy could unfold. In terms of relocation of demographics, both Yazidis and Christians have experienced wholesale ethnic cleansing from the area; and both groups are also under political pressure not to return. Even President Erdogan has apparently stated that “only Sunni Arabs, Turkomens, and Sunni Kurds” should be permitted to remain in the city following liberation (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/turkey-iraq-squabble-threat-mosul-campaign-isis.html). Thus the status of Yazidis and Christians as political refugees may well persist following the fall the city.

From a global perspective, the defeat of ISIS in Mosul will shift the nature of counter-ISIS operations in Iraq back to the familiar – yet unwelcome – patterns of 2003-2014. The absence of a land-war in Iraq requiring intensive air-support operations will also place considerable pressure on the U.S-led coalition to put together a workable game-plan for Syria. Although continually stopping-and-starting, peace-talks in Syria have been more intensive than they have been previously. The new U.S. President is also keen to make substantive headway against ISIS as an early policy objective. The combination of these factors raises the probability in my mind that ISIS could be routed from Al-Raqqa before the year is out.

https://datesandfigs.net/2016/05/23/recapturing-fallujah- again/

https://datesandfigs.net/2016/05/18/mosul-or-al-raqqa-next/

love your institutions, was the title of a piece written by the President of the American University of Beirut, John Waterbury, back in early 2003 and published in Foreign Affairs magazine. It looks at the tension between respect for American educational institutions and antipathy towards American foreign policy.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2003-01-01/hate-your-policies-love-your-institutions

Given the current strained relationship between certain Islamic countries and the American administration over residency visas, I thought it was worth taking a look back to see what – if anything –has changed over the last 13 years.

Waterbury’s main idea was that despite foreign policies that make local residents angry towards the U.S., American educational institutions are largely held in high regard throughout the region. They could be used as a bridge into the local polity. Locals educated in the American system, and through American methods – goes the argument – would have a common frame of reference by which to discuss policy, and to smooth-out relations with Americans.

To support this, Waterbury quotes figures from a Gallup poll in 2002 on the views of persons from Muslim countries towards the United States: “The range of unfavorable views ran from a low of 33 percent in Turkey to a high of 68 percent in Pakistan. The poll also found that respondents overwhelmingly described the United States as “ruthless, aggressive, conceited, arrogant, easily provoked, biased.”

Despite failing to mention that one of his predecessors at AUB had been assassinated, casting immediate doubt on the general extent of appreciation for American educational institutions, Waterbury’s point seems generally valid for its time. AUB was definitely popular while I was there in 2003; it was a springboard for clever, affluent youngsters to go on to interesting careers.

Mistrust towards American foreign policy in the Middle East has, however, increased in the intervening years (e.g. see https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/01/11/who-loves-and-hates-america-a-revealing-map-of-global-opinion-toward-the-u-s/?utm_term=.17bf6be22900). This is with the odd exception: perceptions of America’s actions against ISIS, for example, are reportedly favourable (http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/1-americas-global-image/).

At the same time, the appetite for American education remains as high as it was in 2003, if not higher: local jobs and job markets have become more competitive. The ever-increasing oversight of religious authorities over state education also erodes the ability of local higher educational institutions to compete on a global level, and this increases the attractiveness of a secular, western Education amongst those that can afford it.

One factor that is very different from situation 2003 is the coherence of a social response to policy, facilitated by the media – social or otherwise. Individual opinions can become aggregated and propagated through likes and shares, in a way that was unheard of 13 years ago.

This was seen in the recent temporary U.S travel ban, which generated a vocal response from stakeholders in the U.S. education sector. For example, students from Iran – which has no diplomatic relationship with the U.S. – were prevented from taking up research positions, causing an outcry; while some students and academic staff on residential visas from other Muslim countries turned to social media to criticize the perceived unfairness of the U.S. Administration’s policy towards their co-religionists.

A state of affairs thus exists (and which has been ongoing at least since 2003) in which a percentage of the beneficiaries of American education also have negative views on America the nation-state – which is, almost by definition, defined by its body-politic. The hope in 2003 that education would provide a policy bridge, has not materialized, and is not likely to do so, all things being equal. Additionally, the general antipathy towards American policy is now amplified and made more coherent through social media.

Since persons invested in the American educational system contribute financially to that system, they presumably must hold – at an absolute minimum – some consumer rights, and their voice is thus afforded a level of legitimacy. However, if the average position of all students from a particular geodemographic segment is set-to continually critique U.S. political institutions and U.S. policy, what long-term effect will it have on the educational system? What other (unintended) externalities can be expected, when these demographics return to countries of origin – better educated and better resourced? Within this I include a reduced incentive for the middle classes to improve homegrown institutions.

There must be benefits of foreign-student participation other than purely commercial ones; such as the level of academic contribution to the overall system as suppliers not just customers (post-grads etc.). It might be worthwhile identifying and quantify these benefits.

In 2003, Waterbury identified poor quality American organisations out to make a fast buck from education-deprived Middle Eastern students as one major risk to the credibility of American education as an institution. In 2017 however, an overemphasis on the commercial benefits of education could potentially undermine a whole lot more.

Two fairly significant developments in the Israeli Palestinian conflict took place over the last few days.

The first was a public comment made by Israeli President Reuven Rivlin on the nature of the peace process. President Rivlin’s new position is that wholesale annexation of the West Bank and the transfer of all people within it to Israeli citizenship is preferable to the piecemeal annexation of settlements built on land taken from private Palestinian citizens. In making this statement, the one state solution idea has been officially re-introduced into the Israeli mainstream political discourse.

The other development was the outcome of today’s conference between President Trump and Prime Minster Netanyahu. At the conclusion of their meeting President Trump asked the Prime Minster to hold off on building new settlements, at least on a short-term basis. President Trump also stated that the administration will not predicate its policy on the two state solution – if that pathway is not working for the two parties to the peace agreement.

At the same conference, Prime Minster Netanyahu said that peace would invariable include Israeli control of security “over the entire area west of the Jordan river”, in other words – the whole West Bank. Out of all of this then, it is tempting to conclude that Israel is going to shoot for the one state solution. However, there was little mention of the following:

1. The concept of defining ‘what works for the parties’ is a seriously difficult one to untangle: the Israeli position is regularly hijacked by special interest groups; while the Palestinian position has been variously controlled by decision-makers in Jordan, the Arab League, and the PLO (while it was a terrorist organization, rather than a political one), amongst others.
2. Palestine is already is state, unless it is formally adjudged by the Security Council to be non-self-governing territory. Under no scenario would the full, unilateral annexation of all territory within the West Bank be remotely legal under international law.

To that end, there may well be no tangible, short-term change, other than a short holdup to the settlement building. However, there are two points which are worth keeping in mind. The first is that the seed of an idea of Israeli citizenship has now been sown in the minds of the West Bank Palestinians. This is a seed that will almost certainly be instantly rejected. That being said, for West Bank Palestinians, the idea of equal rights before the law, full civic participation, social security, education, and relatively unhindered travel, may present a more interesting idea over time.

The second factor is that despite all the positive noises from the American administration towards Israel, the way that the policy-defining narrative is presented is largely un-implementable. For example, a slightly closer look reveals that moving the embassy to Jerusalem remains a work in progress. The two state solution can also be dropped as an idea ‘if it doesn’t work for the parties’, but it doesn’t mean that the one state solution is going to be pushed either. At the same time, with this new approach President Trump might be able to achieve what President Obama was not – a halt on settlement construction.

The statements from President Trump may seem overwhelming given their contrast with the guarded statements from the previous administration; however, they are forming an observable tactic – providing gentle pressure where results can be best achieved: Israel. Despite overwhelming international goodwill to the Palestinians, the fact of the matter is that on the ground (where it matters most) the Israelis hold nearly all the cards. To that end, it is a business-like approach, and may hold out the prospect of being able to put together some form of agreement. Perhaps there is a ‘third way’ of approaching the peace process after all.

President Trump’s recent executive order suspending asylum and immigration from certain countries has drawn considerable national and international condemnation. The order impacts a range of countries, all from the Middle East/East Africa; both immigrants and refugees.

The president has powers to restrict and limit immigration. These powers were exercised by President Obama, for example. So long as orders remain “constitutional” and in-line with national law and international agreements that the U.S. has signed up to, they cannot be legally challenged with a fair prospect of success.

The levers that can be used to challenge the law are: (1) for refugees: the refugee convention, which prohibits discrimination against refugees on the basis of religion, and which the U.S has signed; and (2) the Immigration and Nationality Act which also prohibits discrimination for issuing visas.

So the first question is this: does the executive order discriminate on the basis of religion?

In the text of the EO:

• There is clear reference to religion, specifically: that people of minority religions will be prioritized for visa and refugee resettlement. So a form of positive discrimination.
• The basis of implementation is that in order to protect Americans (my emphasis):
  • The U.S “must ensure that people entering the country do not bear hostile attitudes towards it, and its founding principles”;
  • No-one to be admitted who “do not support the Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies over American law”;
  • People who “engage in acts of bigotry or hatred (including “honor” killings, other forms of vioelence against women, or the persecution of those who practice religions different from their own) or those who would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual orientation.”
• And that amongst others, one purpose of suspending the visa process for immigration is to “evaluate the applicant’s likelihood of becoming a positively contributing member of society and the applicant’s ability to make contributions to the national interest.”

The EO thus transcends the requirement to screen for persons only who are technically involved in planning or executing acts of terrorism – it also focuses on the attitudes, practices and beliefs of the immigrants or refugees. It screens them against normative American values on gender, sexual orientation, and freedom of religion.

There is no explicit reference to Islam in the EO, however the countries that are affected by the ban are: Iraq, which has Islamic law as the formal source of law; Iran, which is an Islamic Republic; Sudan and Yemen where the legal system is based on sharia law; and Somalia, where there is no fully applied law, but sharia law is normative.

All of these countries have large numbers of citizens who would wish to harm the U.S physically, it is true. Yet it is the systemic application of sharia law in these countries that helps to formally endow all Muslim citizens with their attitudes towards what is legally permitted in society.

Sharia law does not have equality before the law for gay people, women, or persons of other faiths, for example. As a corollary it allows (technically at least) the violent/lethal condemnation of gays and converts out of Islam, as well as violence against women. Even if those are not personally held beliefs, they legally acceptable beliefs to persons of Islamic faith; and in some Islamic countries they are codified into law.

Because of the countries impacted by the EO, the base case for any person applying for either an immigration visa or refugee resettlement, chosen at random, is that they are of Islamic faith. For either an immigrant or refugee, it may be incumbent upon that person to prove that they do not subscribe to certain values they may be legally permitted to subscribe to.

If, as part of an immigration procedure, immigrants must renounce components of their religion that contain values antithetical to their prospective host nation’s national interest, to what extent is that a form of discrimination? This shows that the executive order is not just about terrorism, it is about values. And to be specific: those of the West and “The Rest”.

Immigration is a choice and it could be argued “if you don’t like it, don’t move there”. But being a (real) refugee is not a choice. Refugees therefore present an additional conundrum because if the refugee holds views that are “against the national interest” of the United States, the question becomes: does the personal right of that refugee to live free from persecution(s) in their state of birth, override the rights of citizens in the U.S. to live in freedom from persecution from that refugee?

This is a deep question. Answering it will be vitally important for the harmonious application 21^st century international law on refugees, which is currently experiencing something of a global breakdown.

That is part 1. In practice there is another part: the political stage management of the EO, and answering that deep question. This moves in parallel with the temporary suspension placed the EO by federal judges, and the potential escalation of the case to the Supreme Court, which is waiting for the appointment of its ninth (and final) judge. With President Trump’s proposed appointment of a judge who takes a literal view of the Constitution, it sets the stage for a very high level debate on whether the application of Islamic law in America (or indeed existing international human rights law on refugees), runs counter to the American Constitution.

And this could well be the purpose of the exercise. If it gets that far, it will start to draw a line in the sand about what constitutes “acceptable” citizenship and long-term residency in the U.S. That is a process that is also rapidly unfolding in Europe of course, but along a different trajectory.

New UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres caused offence to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation earlier this week when he declared that it was “completely clear that the Temple destroyed by the Romans in Jerusalem was a Jewish temple”.  This was in reference to the UNESCO resolution that was passed in October last year, which – amongst others – criticized Israeli handling of holy sites in the Old City. The resolution was taken by Israelis to deny Jewish links to the Temple Mount complex since it did not reference any Jewish names to the features on the site.

Having read the UNESCO resolution yesterday my conclusion is that it:

1. Doesn’t explicitly deny any Jewish links to the Temple Mount complex, as has been claimed by some commentators
2. Is confused as to what constitutes occupied territory: Jerusalem and Palestine
3. Alludes to a narrative about East Jerusalem under the previous Jordanian occupation, which provides a counterbalance to discussions about the Israeli occupation
4. Carries a legitimate argument regarding Israeli construction on or around holy sites

Someone would do well to clarify with UNESCO that under Resolution 181 – accepted by both Palestinians and Israelis as the basis of their statehood – Jerusalem (with specific boundaries) falls under a regime that does not automatically make it the territory of either state, current or future. This area may be occupied and administered by Israel now, but it was previously occupied and administered by Jordan. This is the historical reason why no embassy has yet moved to Jerusalem, it is basis of foreign policy positions of organisations such as the EU. It is an important point.

Israel’s occupation of this area, within the boundaries defined by 181 (excluding the areas of Jerusalem occupied by Israel in 1948) therefore cannot default to being illegal under international law in the same manner that occupation of state, or even a proto-state would be. To be specific: this is because this is not another country’s territory; it is not any country’s territory.

This same argument does not apply to other areas of the West Bank occupied in 1967, e.g. Hebron, where Israel is an occupying power in the de jure state of Palestine. Incidentally, Hebron is referred to by its Jewish name in the resolution, being Al-Khalil in Arabic.

There is, of course, a legitimate basis for grievance that could be pursued by Palestine under international law regarding the Holy City. Even though Jerusalem occupies special status under 181, the holy sites within this area are not to be interfered with.

Established practice prior-to and including 1947, when Resolution 181 was passed, was that no religious area or site should be interfered with, without the tacit agreement of all relevant religious authorities. The argument that the Jordanians destroyed Jewish heritage during their occupation cannot be deployed here in defence, since that was also illegal under 181. This is the only part of the UNESCO resolution which really holds water. The inconsistencies and inaccuracies elsewhere in the document do not do this component of the resolution justice.

Generally speaking, all sides would do well to get to grips with UN Resolution 181 as it is clear on most major aspects of the various claims.

Last week, the UK Prime Minister May and Turkish President Erdogan concluded two bilateral agreements. The first was general: improving the depth of existing trade relations; and the second was for the development of Turkey’s new fighter jet, in partnership with BAe.

This meeting is interesting for two main reasons. It represents a meeting of two countries in EU transition. The UK is on its way out, and Turkey has aspirations to join, or at least it once did. From that perspective it must have seemed faintly reassuring to President Erdogan – the UK apparently providing proof positive that membership of the EU is no-longer the be-all-and-end-all status of nationhood within the European continent.

Secondly, by discussing future trade agreements with a non-EU/EEA party – albeit in the context of existing levels of trade or specific projects – the UK has effectively started its negotiations for economic life outside the block. I wonder if the EU will notice.

Cooperation on a long-term defence project also represents something of a departure from the recent trend of Turkey’s flirtation with countries outside NATO. It could be taken as evidence of commitment from both parties for continued security engagement, regardless of what may happen at an inter-governmental level.

Prime Minister May also took flack for not bringing up the case of human rights abuses following on from the coup attempt last year.

In today’s world, large coup attempts such as the one in Turkey – thousands of participants – are not restricted to one group of people – the military for instance. Plotters cross-cut all demographics of society, and wide-ranging responses should always be anticipated: on the judiciary, the media, higher education and so on. Even if President Erdogan is exceeding his democratic mandate, it would, however, be impossible for his government to hunt out descent without disturbing levels of activity in those areas. Arrests will naturally impact on the ‘rights’ associated with each sphere of activity.

A coup in a stable country is also an exceptional event which requires an exceptional response. Turkey is also in a serious security conundrum; anything less than a firm action leaves the door ajar for further instability – Kurdish fighters, ISIS terrorists, or Turkmen and Russian separatists, Turkey has it all, and we already see their activities play out in real time.

The international community was decidedly ungenerous in its condemnation of the coup attempt; nevertheless, it is the current government and President Erdogan, and not the coup plotters, which represent a popularly elected government. Unless we want to see another country of Europe’s border disintegrate, a dose of realism is required.

The conflict in Yemen has been ongoing in one form or another – on and off – in the same geographic location, between almost identical groups of people, for well over a thousand years.

The Houthis come from from Saada in north Yemen, and since its arrival in the 9^th century Saada has been the spiritual heartland of Zaidi Islam. Zaidis have provided rulers of Yemen at various times across the centuries. The former president Ali Abdullah Saleh is, actually, a Zaidi – he was in power for over 30 years.

Although Saleh was fighting the Houthis before he was deposed, he has since allied himself with them to fight the group led by his former deputy of almost twenty years – Abdurabu Mansur Hadi.  Prior to serving together, Saleh and Hadi were on opposite sides in North and South Yemen, before unification in 1990. Ironically, if the original Houthi insurgency had not deposed Saleh, Hadi would not be president today.

Today, Hadi is back in Aden, while Saleh and his Houthi followers are in Sana’a. Swings and roundabouts.

The players and their demographics are near identical; the men who lead these groups have been fighting each other for decades. It is the balance of power between them changed. Compared with the previous major conflict (of the 80s), the Yemen war is now also a civil war, rather than a war between two neighbouring states. In the last conflict, that had meant that the regional organisation, the Arab League, was able to act as a broker to ceasefire agreements and so on; in this conflict, the Arab League is firmly wrapped up in the fighting.

A civil war does not have the benefit of clarity that a legal border provides; and belligerents of the same country are reliant on external assistance.  Hadi has the backing of Arab sunni states and all their institutions, whilst the Houthis are constrained to finding friends amongst the shia community. In recent years, that has led to an inevitable shift towards Iran.

This is probably why the conflict persists, when the Houthis might have routed Hadi by now. Saudi Arabia would rather embed itself in a long-term war on its southern border than freely permit Houthis to rule Yemen while Iran is in the background.

That puts everything in a bind. After 1,150 or so years, the Zaidi communities are in Yemen to stay. And although it is a more recent, politicized movement, Houthis are inseparable from Zaidi Islam. Short of ethnic cleansing, the Houthis movement can never be completely eliminated only suppressed.

This means that in their best case scenario, the Saudis and Abdu Rabbu Hadi have only one realistic objective to aim for: that Houthis are forced out of from Sana’a and back to their northern stronghold. In any solution, Houthis will have to be accommodated in the political process.

In a further irony, the Houthis have previously acknowledged that Hadi is – in fact –  the legitimate ruler of Yemen. It was the pace and depth of his reforms in the country that they took issue with. In the past they have even offered Hadi a power-sharing deal.

Maybe if Hadi aimed for something such as a power-sharing deal, the civil war would have a prospect of closing.  However, the pockets of the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council are deep, and they can afford to support a proxy war for as long as the Houthis are willing to fight it. While he carries their backing, Hadi has no incentive to power-share.

The GCC have, however, paid a heavy price for their involvement. If the Saudis which to persevere with continuing with an (militarily) unwinnable mission, perhaps its allies should look for other ways to counter Iranian influence in the region that are less costly – politically and financially – as well as more effective.

In the meantime – and in order to help avert the humanitarian disaster unfolding in the country – the international community would be well advised to reexamine the moribund efforts at peace-brokerage being provided by the UN.

One of President Trump’s campaign promises was the destruction of ISIS. Under current circumstances, how long will it take to defeat ISIS, if at all? What can be done to increase the efficacy the current approach?

Counter ISIS operations got off to a slow start – 2-3 years after the group first started to take shape. Once it did, however, degradation picked up a pace. In Syria and Iraq and estimated 25,000 ISIS personnel were killed over 11 months, while over a similar period in Afghanistan the number of local ISIS fighters were reduced by at more than half – completely expelling them from numerous provinces.

In Syria the recent extent of gains has been reduced, but we can expect the ground campaign to accelerate as-and-when there is traction in the ceasefire and political dialogue. In Iraq we can expect ISIS to be completely routed, as-and-when the attack on Mosul is completed.

On the current trajectory then – and against ISIS specifically – the U.S can expect: wins in Iraq or Syria; steady degradation of capacity in Afghanistan; and no change or worse, in Yemen or any other country where there are no U.S operations.

In terms of changing or accelerating this trajectory the geographic scope of operations can be extended; and/or the strategic mix of activities can be adjusted.

As long as we are being strict with definitions about defeating ISIS however, there is no need to extend the scope of operations to any additional country. Despite their proclamation of a worldwide caliphate, defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in both Iraq and Syria will force the group to rebrand if not disband. Fortunately ISIS’s centre of gravity – which is in Syria and Iraq – offers realistic prospect of near-term military success.

If definitions are not strict, then any new strategy has the potential to grow arms and legs very quickly in terms of global military commitments. It would swiftly reduce to countering any other form of decentralized, international-jihadi organization – of the type we have known for decades.

If pursuing a policy of capturing low-hanging fruit in Iraq and Syria, one strategic adjustment could be to prioritise a more militarized approach in the short-term. This would be on the basis that complete victory in those countries will automatically undermine the ideology, recruitment, and funding of ISIS globally. Tactical shifts could include harmonization of airstrikes with non-traditional partners such as Russia (now a possibility). It could also include boosting ground forces in support of Iraqi government or Peshmerga forces for the attack on Mosul; although this would risk interaction with Iranian forces – a complex scenario if a review of U.S. sanctions against Iran is in the policy pipeline.

In any case, a fair amount could potentially be done with little additional resource – particularly in Syria.