My last post was some time ago – back in June – and the subject was Erdogan’s bridge-building efforts towards Russia. It seems fitting to return to blogging with a post on Turkey. Since my last blog there has been Turkish land invasion, and in the last few days a nationwide, Russian- and Turkish-backed ceasefire that looks in jeopardy of falling apart.

Although a positive development, the ceasefire comes as little surprise, and shows what can happen when active belligerents with the overwhelming resources signal actually want to talk; and also now the west has largely lost interest in supporting a proxy war. Signed by Syria and the opposition forces, Russia and Turkey guarantee the ceasefire, and Iran is also a signatory to the agreement.

There are two factors however, that look set to torpedo this peace-deal (and any similar one like it) and one is already causing it to break down. These factors relate to the level of investment of Syria and Turkey.

Since the Russians intervened, Russia and Syria have been treated as largely the same force; this is reasonable since Russian aircraft operate within the Syrian order of battle. Yet while Russia can withdraw from the conflict without suffering serious internal political consequence, the Syrian regime is implicitly invested. Assad shows every intention of recapturing all of Syria, and has carried on attacking pain points around Damascus. This is now breaking the ceasefire on the short-term.

The level of Turkish investment has longer term implications. Turkey probably follows Syria as the nation-state with most to lose from this conflict. That being said, Turkey has still not suffered enough to prioritize peace over politics, and still demands the removal of Assad, even as part of any transitional peace arrangement.

The Turkish demand has almost certainly reduced the Syrian regime’s desire to seriously participate in peace-talks. It is a very different stated objective to that of Russia and Iran, and thus likely to reduce the prospect of a workable peace. Preconditions that align weaker with those parties in the weaker bargaining position, only sets the stage for continued conflict.

Lastly, a collapse of the ceasefire shows that the Russian influence over the Syrian regime carries its limitations. Even if there is more politicking within this peace agreement than meets the eye, a lack of influence will be the general perception across the world. While the US was involved in brokering ceasefires – with or without Russia – there was always a scapegoat. Russia may now begin to find itself in the same unenviable firing line that the US has been in, in recent years.

Turkey has been hit with a mass-casualty terrorist attack at Istanbul airport. The attack comes hot on the heels of two significant Turkish foreign policy initiatives. Could they be related?

The first initiative is the ‘normalisation’ of relations between Turkey and Israel, which were interrupted following the storming of the Turkish-flagged ship the Mavi Mamara by Israeli special forces. The main result will be improved political legitimacy for Israel; reduced political tensions in the eastern Mediterranean, and humanitarian and development aid for Gaza.

The second initiative are a letter written and phone call from President Erdogan to President Putin, apologizing for the downing of the Russian fighter aircraft by Turkey in December 2015, and discussing resumption of economic and political ties. It comes after six months of bitter recriminations between the two countries, and an escalation of Russian-NATO tensions.

The timing of these overtures suggests there may be connection between the political shifts in Europe (Brexit referendum). Erdogan is likely to be hedging his bets on EU member states adopting more isolationist foreign policies (together or separately), regardless of whether the UK remains or leaves union. Regional stability is attractive, and an unproductive cold war with Israel does not help Turkey; while the Turkish counter-balance to Europe has historically been Russia.

Critics of the Israel deal can find consolation in supporting Gaza during the holy month of Ramadan. Also, Israel’s main focus in the Syrian conflict has been Hezbollah; siding with Israel does not immediately impact the dynamics of conflict in a way that might impact Turkey.

On the other hand, rapprochement with Russia may well alter the balance of power materially against ISIS. Russia is committed to supporting the Syrian regime – militarily and otherwise – and has been involved on bombing campaigns that have drawn outrage from across the sunni Arab world. Restoring relations with Russia is a move that all sunni groups will feel as a betrayal.  Since the regime has signaled its intent to recapture all territory, and has been fighting directly with ISIS in the last few weeks, this may also be viewed as a precursor to more substantive cooperation along the border areas.

Up to this point, ISIS and Turkey have had an ambiguous relationship. Restoring relations with Russia places these two actors into potentially opposing camps. ISIS has likely sent Erdogan the message: continue on this path, and chaos will be unleashed across Turkey. Despite the horrendous nature of the attacks, ISIS still has room to escalate – into the tourist destinations.

ISIS also knows that harming the tourist economy of Turkey will reduce its own support base within the country, which remains vital for it to operate. They took a gamble, however, that tourism would not be officially affected. It is working out: European countries, which form the bulk of visitors to Turkey, are already proving reluctant to exacerbate instability in Europe by not refining travel advice to Turkey.

The Syrian regime and the Kurdish paramilitaries have managed to avoid the high levels of conflict seen elsewhere in the country. Over the years, there have also been reports of cooperation between Kurdish militia, militias loyal to the Syrian regime, as well as the Russian air force.

The Syrian regime viewpoint may well be that Kurdish territorial ambitions, beyond federal autonomy, will always be denied by Ankara – by military means as necessary. This has meant that the Syrian government can focus its attentions elsewhere; at least for the time being.

Recent reports show however that the Kurds have been advancing on Al-Raqqa. They are still some distance away, although they are moving in the right direction. At the moment however, the Kurds are still operating in their own ballpark, but the farther down the Euphrates they get, the more into unfamiliar Arab/sunni territory they will stray. The Kurds may well begin to ask themselves what they are doing, so far away from their homeland. Particularly since the Assad government is busy building up an attack posture of its own against Al-Raqqa.

The end of the civil war will eventually come, and the Kurdish decision-makers know that short of a collapse of Turkish statehood, the most optimal political outcome they can hope for is federal autonomy. The strength of this autonomy this will be determined by the final reckoning on the battlefield – as it was for them in Iraq. Federal autonomy can then be used to continue to build support for statehood through international mechanisms. The Kurds have come a long way towards their objective in the last twenty years, and this will be another milestone on their journey.

It is also still clear that Washington is pushing to minimize the role of Assad in post-conflict Syria, the Kurds can help, and they know this. Pushing towards Al-Raqqa will satisfy the U.S./western desire to deny Assad extensive gains against ISIS, and thus weaken his position as the different factions move towards end-game in major hostilities. With the regime now pushing ISIS and the collection of other anti-Assad forces onto the back foot however, an over-extended Kurdish position is coming into Syrian regime focus again.

The Syrians and Russians have not had to test the resolve of the U.S. led coalition to defend its Kurdish allies from a consolidated Syrian regime attack, now that U.S-forces are embedded with the Kurds. Even if they won’t retaliate to a Turkish one, it is still a risk. It still seems as though the Syrian Regime would still rather accept some form of Kurdish federalism, rather than do so. At the same time it seems that the media is now being used to weaken the Kurdish resolve to support the U.S.-coalition, at a political and international level. A standpoint questioning the reliability of U.S-led intentions towards the Kurds appears to be the messaging approach used. The example I have seen can be read here: https://www.rt.com/op-edge/345411-kurds-isis-syria-us/.

The Kurds will be acutely sensitive to their position even if they are unlikely to be swayed by the media. They have to play a balancing act: ensure that they maintain the leverage they need for negotiations, satisfy the U.S.-coalition demands – necessary for post-war political support – and avoid escalating the conflict with the Syrian and Turkish governments. At the time of writing, the visible side of this balancing act will be seen in how far they advance down the river towards Al-Raqqa.

The advance on the ISIS strongholds in the Mesopotamian river valley in Iraq and Syria continues to draw a concerned reaction from sunni media outlets and commentators.

One popular comparison I have read on an Al-Jazeera message board likens the siege of Fallujah with Gaza, with the shia-led Iraqi forces as Israelis. On the channel itself, analysts have expressed their fears that the siege is part of a wider conspiracy to change the sunni demographic south of the Euphrates and east of the Tigris. Al-Jazeera also runs daily reports on the deployment of shia of militias around Fallujah, pairing these stories with those on the displacement of families by the siege. This supports the idea of ethnic cleansing.

Over the last 13 years there have been forced movements of sunni and shia populations. Much of this was within Baghdad – across the Adhamiya-Kadhimiya divide for example. These movements were forced by the unregulated militia or terrorist groups, both sunni and shia. By deploying shia militia and Iranian forces, it is certainly true that the government is exacerbating an ethnic dimension to the Fallujah siege, where the focus of their attention – ISIS – is an exclusively sunni group.

Nevertheless, I cannot believe this ethnic component has any long term implications for the human geography of al-Anbar. In the previous two Fallujah conflicts since 2004, sunni families have left and returned, and there was no movement by outside groups to appropriate the land. The governorate is historically sunni, it contains little of Iraq’s economic resources, and no sites of shia religious interest. Importantly, the Iraqi government is in the driving seat, with the world’s attention focused on their performance. It is highly unlikely that the government would permit any form of long-term displacement, unless perhaps through negligence.

On a more regional note, wherever sunni communities are affected by the conflict to destroy ISIS, observers in peripheral sunni countries are placed in a dilemma depending on what kind of regime is in power. ISIS or al-Qaeda can be called a threat to stability in countries where there is a reasonable prospect of installing a sunni government, such as Yemen or a federal Syria. In countries where there is no foreseeable prospect of a sunni government however, such as Iraq, observers may be tempted to equate ISIS with a legitimate form of resistance. This cannot be done overtly, since it would jeopardize too many critical, western relationships. Instead, ISIS becomes a bogeyman, created by the west (in conspiracy with Iran) to permit aggression against sunni populations.

Interestingly, it also involves in the naming of the organization. The term daesh is used by Kurds, shia and some in the West, so it is not acceptable. To call it the Islamic State in media would imply tacit endorsement – a term too legitimate and threatening to existing sunni regimes. Instead, the term The Islamic State Organisation is adopted as compromise. The root of the word ‘organization’ in Arabic has etymological associations with the concept of ‘regime’.

Two stories have caught my eye these last few days.

The first is that U.S. special forces fighting alongside the YPG in northern Syria were filmed wearing YPG insignia. The YPG is considered by NATO-ally Turkey to be a rebranded Syrian version of the PKK – an outlawed terrorist group, which is blacklisted by the U.S. and E.U amongst others. Turkey complained, and the debate highlights the new alliances in the fight against ISIS. This is not limited to Syria. In Iraq, the Al-Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards is reportedly participating in the fighting in Fallujah where the coalition is supporting the ground offensive with air strikes. Saudi Arabia has raised an issue with this participation, but has stopped short of criticizing the coalition.

The prospect of defeating ISIS has adjusted who it is politically attractive to work with. In Syria, there seems to now be a race to snatch a victory against ISIS from Assad forces. In Iraq, it is the western acceptance of the entrenched Iranian influence in Iraqi national security – as long as it is working in the same direction.

The second story is the prospect of a new “summer war” in the Gaza strip that has been raised in the Israeli press. This comes with the unexpected appointment of hard-liner Avigdor Lieberman to the position of Israeli Defence Minister. Lieberman has long been pushing for the return of Israeli corpses held by Hamas since Operation Protective Edge, and, if he has a say in it, threatening the assassination of Hamas leader Ismael Haniyeh if it is not completed. Now he does have more of a say in it.

Spiraling tit-for-tat reprisals have lead to the previous conflicts in the strip. Of late however, we have not seen the types of rocket bombardments fired into Israel that prompted the main offensives in previous years. Egypt has been forcefully blocking tunnels from Rafah, and Hamas appears to be cooperating with the Egyptian regime. There is even talk in Israel about constructing an internationally-administered, offshore port for Gaza. Most importantly, another war in the Gaza strip is unlikely to draw the same types of rhetorical support from western leaders as it did at the beginning of the 2014 conflict, if the trigger event is the largely unprompted assassination of Haniyeh.

There have been three conflicts in the last 8 years, and the return of corpses is an emotive issue on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, I think it unlikely that there will be a summer war under current conditions.

The main Islamic party in Tunisia, Al-Nahda, announced this week that it is distancing itself from ‘political Islam’. According to the ‘intellectual leader’ of Al-Nahda, Rached Ghannouchi, it plays no role in post-Arab Spring Tunisia. Elected officials within the party will no longer be able to moonlight in civil society groups, such as religious or charitable organisations.

Al-Nahda is the second largest party in government, with around 28 % of the parliamentary seats, so on the face of it, this move seals the deal on a post-revolution, secular democracy. But soundbites designed to find favour with tourists and the IMF hide a more complex picture.

Ghannouchi also said: “From today, we are seriously moving towards becoming a national and civil political party with an Islamic core, which operates under the country’s constitution and inspires Muslim and modern values”. If religious values remain at the core of the party then Islam will still inform and guide all party policy.

In post-revolution Tunisia, when Al-Nahda was allowed to form, it promoted an Islamist ticket and won the first elections. Only five years ago then, most of the Tunisian public had an appetite for some flavour of political Islam. Two years later, in 2013, violent Islamists were also identified with Al-Nahda. Although that caused a fall from grace at the 2014 election, the party still represents about half of the country.

Political Islam has been a force within the Middle East since the Islamic Revolution in Iran and it will not just disappear. This is probably all just window-dressing.

If nothing has changed then, what is the problem?

At the moment, Tunisia is clamping down hard on extremism, and there are reports of mass detentions of salafists – many of whom could simply be non-violent, ultra-conservatives. Combined with considerable economic hardship, a clampdown on the black economy, in areas where Al-Nahda is located, it is a dangerous mix of structural factors.

Within this context, political Islam been located at the heart of government since the revolution, the conservative factions within Al-Nahda will have felt that they have a voice. Modifying the language that these people can use, will restrict this voice, and it will push some away from the mainstream political process.

 

Last night, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi used twitter to announce that the operation to retake Fallujah has begun. For the local inhabitants this is simply the latest iteration in a repetitive cycle of resistance, destruction, and reconstruction. In terms of the wider picture however, recapture of Fallujah will be major nail in the coffin of ISIS in Iraq.

The advantage, if there is one, to undertaking so much conflict on a single geography over a period of 12 years is that many lessons have been learned, tribal affiliations well understood, and urban geography familiar. The routing of previous militants, such as the Sunni resistance in 2004, and the Zarqawi network in 2007, shows that removing terrorist groups from Fallujah can be done.

The Iraqi army has just battle-tested 12,500 troops in the operation of neighbouring Ramadi – a bigger city – and this has proved a sufficient number of troops for previous assaults on Fallujah. The Iraqi forces understand the psychology of their opponents, and are confident following their military success. Importantly, and worryingly, they will not be constrained to avoiding collateral damage to the same extent as U.S. forces, for example. Last night’s videos showing Katusha-type rocket launchers releasing salvos of unguided missiles on ISIS positions in Fallujah confirms this.

On the other hand, Fallujah residents also have a long history of resistance to outsiders that predates the 2003 invasion.  Fallujah was also the first Iraqi city to fall to ISIS, and the ISIS presence has apparently been appealing to Fallujah’s residents. The local population is fiercely against the Shia-dominated central government. That being said, Fallujah has been under siege for some months, there is reportedly little food left in the city and that ISIS is preventing any of the 90,000 inhabitants from leaving. The population will be weakened, and local support for the foreign elements of ISIS eroded.

What can we expect to happen?

Unless there has already been significant, unannounced ground forces build-up, the escalation of air and artillery preparation of ISIS positions will continue for several days, and people encouraged to leave. Then we will see a carbon copy of the Ramadi offensive: forward operations undertaken by Iraqi special forces units with coalition air-support; regular forces consolidating any gains; and limited participation of the Shia’ popular militias on the periphery. Militia participation is controversial given Sunni sensibilities. It bolsters the number of troops however, and represents a tough psychological option, should the government choose to use it.

If the foreign fighters are removed from Fallujah within the next 2.5 months, then we will know that the approach has been as effective as previous ones on the city. There will then be an opportunity to work on bridging grievances with local/Iraqi militants. Iraqi forces will also be ready, psychologically as well as militarily, to turn to Mosul.

The Yemen peace talks in Kuwait seem to be at a standstill. As I have written previously, the Houthis are deeply skeptical of the process. They feel that accepting terms will either continue the status quo in the country, or otherwise divide it up into federalised areas that have unequal resource. The president was elected however, and the political process was inclusive, so is it reasonable for the Houthis to question the legitimacy of these things?

Current Yemeni president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi was the vice president of Yemen from 1994 to 2012. No-one can deny that during this time ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh called all the shots, but this still represents 18 years at the centre of power, by Saleh’s side. Hadi was then elected as acting president of a transitional government once Saleh left, however he was the only candidate to choose from on the ballot sheet.

Despite being the only option to vote for however, a rare showing of broad, cross-party consensus during the revolution did mean that Hadi was probably the only acceptable candidate at that time. Nevertheless, it is not reasonable to expect that this consensus must continue four years down the line; particularly following a resurgence of the civil war.

Still, the GCC countries remain active political supporters of the Hadi government. In Kuwait, they are pushing for all parties to the conflict to return to the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) which was the major post-Saleh peace effort.

President Hadi presided over the NDC which ran from March 18. 2013, to January 24, 2014. During that time, two Houthi representatives to the NDC were assassinated, and so they refused to participate in the conference any further. The Houthis also said that the NDC proposed a federal government that would divide the country up into poor and wealthy regions, so they did not sign up to its outcomes.

One year later, the Houthis successfully invaded Sana’a proving them to be one of the most powerful and interested stakeholders in Yemeni politics. With hindsight then, the NDC was insufficient as a political dialogue process. It is not legitimate to at least one of the major stakeholders.

It is fairly obvious then that Hadi as a president represents ‘business as usual’ while the NDC dialogue process was inadequate at incorporating the views of all stakeholders. Notwithstanding the constraints of real politic, and the absence of better – or even acceptable – alternatives, it is still reasonable to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the president and Yemeni political process. This does not legitimise or excuse the methods of the Houthis in their insurgency.

Unless the GCC and UN revisit some fundamental aspects political process they hope to return to, the peace talks with Houthis are unlikely to progress beyond simple technicalities (e.g. prisoner exchange).

With the recapture of Ramadi from ISIS control, and ISIS on the back foot in Syria, commentators in the Arab media have been speculating on whether Mosul in Iraq, or Al-Raqqa in Syria will be next to fall.

Although both cities are within the so-called Islamic State, the context of each, and warring parties available to fight in the conflict are different. Both will require urban fighting, and thus ground forces. The troops will require air support. Each city is of different political importance to ISIS. Post-capture, both cities will require civil administration, and how this will be achieved is far from clear.

Iraqi forces have greater readiness and have just proved their capability in Ramadi. Syrian forces remain focused on targets farther away, and tied up in fighting with the Free Syrian Army and other groups.

In both countries, the Kurdish forces have been engaging ISIS on the periphery and are best positioned to make an advance. The population of Mosul is predominantly Kurdish, and so while Kurds may be accepted as a liberating force in Mosul however, their arrival in Al-Raqqa would lead to additional conflict with the local Arab population. Any further expansion of the Kurdish sphere of influence in Syria is also likely to receive opposition from Turkey.

In terms of air cover, the international coalition is operating against ISIS in both countries. The Iraqi forces are supported by the international coalition; the Russian airforce supports the Syrian regime.  In Syria, the Kurds receive support from both. In an attack on Al-Raqqa by Syrian government forces, would the international collation provide them with air support? There is still some distance to go to get to that point as it would cement tacit support of the West for the Syrian regime.

The citizenry of Mosul are mainly Kurds, who have their own national interests. The national political process of Iraq, albeit Shia dominated, is one in which the Kurds are well-represented. In Al-Raqqa, as elsewhere in the central regions of Syria, the Assad regime has no legitimacy amongst swathes of the Sunni population. An attack on Mosul would be more acceptable to the local civilian population than an attack on Al-Raqqa.

Unless there is a lasting ceasefire between the Syrian regime and the SFA, an attack on Mosul is more likely to take place before a ground attack Al-Raqqa.

One of the main barriers to undertaking the Mosul offensive however, will be psychological. The Iraqi army crumbled in the face of the initial ISIS advance. This has been attributed to collusion, corruption, and/or psychological intimidation. Whatever the reasons, this psychological barrier will need to be overcome. Although Al-Raqqa is the declared ISIS capital, any fighting inside Mosul will still be fierce. This psychological posturing will not happen overnight.