Today marked the end of the 2017 Arab Summit held at the Dead Sea in Jordan. The Summit is an opportunity for Arab countries to formulate common positions on regional issues of the day, the main ones currently being: Israel/Palestine, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Yemen.

One of the most interesting points to arise from the meeting was a re-offer of the Arab peace plan: normalization of ties with Israel in return for the recognition of a Palestinian State in pre-1967 borders. This was the Arab world’s official response to President Trump’s policy position that the U.S. would only pursue a two-state solution if was what the two parties believed was in their best interest.

It’s worth repeating this proposal: the Arab world is re-offering Israel full normalization of relations in return for the recognition of Palestine within 1967 borders. What could be a better proposition than this? The initial reaction from Israel was apparently cool however, with the Israelis saying they would prefer to pursue common interest projects instead – such as countering Iranian influence in the region – as a preliminary path to peace.

This gives a glimpse into the cost-benefit rationale of Israeli decision-makers: (1) normalization of ties with (formerly?) hostile neighbours is not immediately better than (formally) conceding a two-state solution; (2) ties with neighbours are likely to improve naturally by pursuing common security issues, driven by increasing urgency; and (3) with regional instability being at an unprecedented high, the prospect of rescinding any aspects of security control of the West Bank is a bridge too far.

The Saudis were apparently the major centre of gravity at the Summit. They drew praise from President Abdu Rabo Mansur Hadi of Yemen for their efforts in keeping his disenfranchised government. There was also apparently something of a rapprochement between the Saudis and the Egyptians, after their recent fall-out over future governance options in Syria. The Syrians were absent from the meeting.

A lot can happen between now and next year’s Summit in Saudi Arabia. Whatever does happen, one thing can be sure: the Iranian presence will almost certainly have increased. Short of the highly unlikely complete overthrow of the Syrian government, Iran remain be heavily present even following a peace agreement: it has surfaced in the news again that Syria has accepted something in the region of 5 billion dollars in credit from Iran, annually. This will likely buy Iran access to Syrian ports in the Mediterranean (in addition to their direct Caspian and Gulf access); and no doubt the Iranians and President Assad would wish to continue their alliance even without any financial commitments.

With the saturation of Lebanon with Iranian-backed groups, and the political and military support that that the Iranians have provided the Iraqis, the Iranians now have a solid presence across the whole northern sector of the Middle East.

No wonder the Saudis, as well as the Israelis, are feeling the heat.

Despite their differences, the Iranians and Arabs do have a common position with regards Palestine, the question is: when will the Iranian issue eclipse the Palestinian issue in minds of the so-called Arab street, and as a corollary – when will Palestinians in the West Bank begin to see better prospects of salvation in Iran than in the Arab League? Hamas in Gaza is looking as though it has already made the tilt. Gaza’s economic necessities have overridden popular sensibilities over Iranian military actions against Sunnis in Aleppo. Money does talk.