The last fifteen years have been particularly testing for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The installation of the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad started a ‘descent’ of the northern Middle East into Iranian-influence. The uprisings of the Arab spring also brought concerns over conflict with Shia populations in Sunni states across the Arabian Peninsula, and KSA was no-exception. When they came, the ‘revolutions’ in both Syria and Yemen quickly became power-struggles between poverty-stricken Sunni and Shia factions; calling for support from their co-religionists in other countries.

The rapid dismantling of the traditional power structures has come so thick and fast, that it has led to a series of hasty – and with the benefit of hindsight, ill-conceived – foreign policy decisions by KSA. Of these, the most disastrous own-goal was to saturate the oil market. The carefully constructed world oil market behaves as a ‘game’ in an economic sense, and the oil price rise was premised on a set of carefully balanced factors built-up over the preceding years. The price was easy to smash, but has proved difficult to reconstruct when needed – leading to massive deficits in the KSA budget.

The second most obvious decision has been the invasion of Yemen, and commitment to an unwinnable war against an adversary that has been entrenched for centuries. This was done at the perception of an Iranian interference in the country. The extent of this interference – or whether it even exists – is debated by analysts. In any case, the war cannot be won by military means, which leads to an endless drain on resources and morale: fomenting a national psychology of a besieged state.

The third decision falls into a pattern which the Saudis have been strategically repeating since the 1980s, except on a much broader scale: resource support to Islamic-militant groups that align with an international-jihad agenda. This was a concept that paid off in Afghanistan against the Soviets and against the Serbs in Bosnia, but has otherwise caused much political grief with respect to U.S.-Saudi relations post 9-11, and brought with it a global perception of being a state-sponsor of terrorism. This reputation may be ‘acceptable’ for countries with large Muslim populations; but not-so-much for those with minority ones.

It can be, and is probably, argued that each of these policy decisions has been naturally in-keeping with historical precedent, and Wahabi/Saudi Arabian sensibilities; a general price paid for doing business with the Saudis. While an element of doubt remains of the extent to which Saudi intelligence may have control over of international jihadi groups, these relationships could be exploited, and any negative consequences consigned to bad-luck; there is never any solid accusation that the Saudi regime has actively, and deliberately, targeted any Western government.

In a development which has been seemingly missed by most commentators however, historical precedent with respect to KSA-Western relations is being overturned. China and KSA have recently signed a raft of bilateral agreements comprising including enormous trade and oil deals. Given the timing of this week’s crackdown by Chinese authorities on civil liberties of ethnic Uighurs, it comes as no surprise. Saudi Arabia hosts an ethnic Uighur community, and like Turkey beforehand, China provided the economic mollification to the foreign regime: to reduce the likelihood of criticism when increased pressure came the following week.

KSA is apparently desperate enough for allies and future markets for its oil that it would sell out the Sunni Uighurs. While less than honorable perhaps, this is an internal Saudi prerogative, and it is their sovereign business to do so. In any case, it is a non-economic element of the bilateral agreement which sets the alarm bells ringing: KSA and China have agreed to collaborate on China’s far-side of moon space mission in 2018.

The Chinese space program – commercial or otherwise – is inextricably linked with their military program. For anyone interested in understanding how that military program is being developed in direct opposition to western interests is strongly-advised to read the following congressional testimony on the matter: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf. Not least the worrisome quote on the final page: “Congress should request that the Administration clarify with Chinese officials the disclosures that Chinese President Xi Jinping has personally ordered services of the PLA to prepare for space combat”.

There is a new set of power relations emerging, that is obvious, and not just in the Middle East. While it may seem like science fiction to many people, the next major strategic security challenge has been here for some time already – “space control”. With its agreement with KSA, China has played a card with both internal political ramifications – the Uighurs – along with a military one. Sooner or later KSA might-well be expected to clarify its intentions with respect getting involved with, and potentially part-funding, China’s space program.

KSA has already set an astronaut into space – with NASA. It might be worth reminding Riyadh that in the 21^st century you cannot pick-and-mix your partners on space programs. Along with a sell-out to the Sunnis of China, which will come to be recognized sooner or later, this decision may turn out to be more of a bitter pill than expected.

Lastly, there is an important lesson here for Western nations. Also, as the supreme benefactor of the Arab world, the Saudis are averse to requesting direct assistance – it does not mesh well with general image management. Nevertheless that masks a major issue: KSA is in deep distress, perceived and actual. The lackadaisical approach to bi-lateral politics practiced by many Arab states – not least because of their own internal concerns and problems – means that Arab states have a difficult time finding rock-solid allies, which can lead to a deep sense of isolation. (The UAE may be an exception here.) To avoid a potential catastrophe, it is high time that the risk was openly acknowledged, and for western states to extend a helping hand.