Meta-communication in warfare is nothing particularly new. Military forces may choose to deliberately target enemy target symbols that carry no direct military threat, such as the toppling of a statue of Saddam Hussein; or choose targets that carry a message of revenge – such as the tit-for-tat bombings of historic cities by the allies and Nazis in World War Two.

In an blossoming age of meta-communication provided by the internet, this practice has grown significantly – to deliver crowing threats, or taunt adversaries. Nothing is sacrosanct; and when the smoke clears enough to allow a glimpse beyond the directly observable in the latest terrorist atrocity a glaring meta-message is sometimes to be found.

The village of Khan Sheikhun in Idlib province in Syria was hit with a suspected Sarin gas attack earlier this week. That chemical weapons caused the attack is not denied by either party. However, both sides have claimed the other party is in some way responsible – one directly, the other indirectly; the rebels say it was a regime plane, the regime says it was a rebel munitions factory containing chemical munitions which were then released when it was bombed.

The regime has the means to provide an aerial delivery. It also has a well-documented history of stockpiling weapons, and a ‘record’ if you like, with OPCW and the international community for allegedly using such weapons in the recent past. The Russian government also confirmed that the Syrian Airforce did target a warehouse in the town (https://www.rt.com/news/383522-syria-idlib-warehouse-strike-chemical). However, the timings given for their air-strike are somewhat later than the time of the chemical strike reported by the media, which was at around day-break. Air activity over Idlib province was reportedly no more than usual (http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/04/05/522093672/the-view-from-khan-shaykhun-a-syrian-describes-the-attacks-aftermath).

At least one chemical weapons experts has come out to say that any bombardment would have incinerated the chemicals, rendering them useless, and thus the Syrian regime explanation does not add up. As has happened before with munitions dumps in the general region however (such as Taji West in Iraq) an explosion on a munitions warehousing facility can create enough over-pressure to expel/jettison munitions which have not been fully destroyed in the initial blast, which can then arm and detonate. If that site contained chemical munitions in different states of preparation and storage, it cannot be expected that an aerial bombardment will provide a fail-safe means of destroying chemical weaponry.

The statement from Hasan Haj Ali, commander of the Free Idlib Army rebel group that “everyone saw the plane while it was bombing with gas” is insufficient as it currently stands. Poison gas is not generally ‘bombed’ in the conventional sense and if it has been air-served in dropped canisters, a strike should be relatively easy to prove. Rockets were heard too. Rockets can deliver chemical weapons, and they are held by both sides.

To make matters more complicated, chemical weapons routinely fall into the hands of non-state actors, and there is every suggestion that certain belligerent groups would be willing to use them to further their purposes. These actors would almost certainly be willing to use more ‘risky’ deployment methods, as they do not have an air-force.

All that being said, the Syrian Regime has not suggested that a chemical weapons strike was deliberately made by the opposition. Nor has any opposition group made the claim that they made the strike.

In any case, this will all need to be clarified in any investigation, along with an examination of the warehouse site. There is a defined procedure (Article XI CWC), and as a state-party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Syria does not have a choice but to accept it. Until that happens, it will boil down to a she-said, he-said situation regarding whether it was a bombed stockpile or a deliberate airstrike; with only the two parties knowing the truth of the matter.

Nevertheless, there is one factor that has not been considered in the traditional analysis. This is the meta-message.

Generally speaking, Khan Sheikhun as a deliberate target of a chemical weapons strike provides something of a mystery. If Syrian warplanes are generally targeting the area, then it is presumably outside of government control, nevertheless there were no armed groups reported to be based there. Daily life was ongoing, with children going to school and so forth. Aside from an alleged warehouse it had no real feature worthy of targeting. Except its name.

Like many older settlements across the Arab world, Khan Sheikhun has a whimsical name with a literal meaning. Another form of meta message if you like, relating to the history of a place. Sometimes the meaning still stands, such as the name of Palmyra in Arabic which literally means something like “destruction” – an apt name if ever there was one. Sometimes the meaning is lost or no-longer obvious.

Sheikhun is a masculine plural form of the word sheikh that unsurprisingly means sheikh – elder or leader – a plural form occasionally used instead of the standard plural, sheiyukh.  Khan in Arabic has an obvious meaning of an ‘inn’ or a ‘hotel’, but interestingly the word also carries other meanings, all of which are in a similar vein: to betray, to rat, to sell-out, to play-false, to squeal, to split, or to two-time.

“Treacherous leaders”.

Is the meta-statement, and this murderous attack on this relatively-peaceful village was the fire breathed into it.

The question on my mind is: whose meta-message is this?